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Abstract
In an election via a positional scoring rule, each candidate receives from each voter a score that is
determined only by the position of the candidate in the voter’s total ordering of the candidates. A
winner (respectively, unique winner) is a candidate who receives a score not smaller than (respectively,
strictly greater than) the remaining candidates. When voter preferences are known in an incomplete
manner as partial orders, a candidate can be a possible/necessary (unique) winner based on the
possibilities of completing the partial votes. The computational problems of determining the
possible and necessary winners and unique winners have been studied in depth, culminating in a full
classification of the class of “pure” positional scoring rules into tractable and intractable ones for
each problem.
Tha above problems are all special cases of reasoning about the range of possible positions of
a candidate under different tie breakers. Determining this range, and particularly the extremal
positions, arises in every situation where the ranking plays an important role in the outcome of an
election, such as in committee selection, primaries of political parties, and staff recruiting. Our main
result establishes that the minimal and maximal positions are hard to compute (DP-complete) for
every positional scoring rule, pure or not. Hence, none of the tractable variants of necessary/possible
winner determination remain tractable for extremal position determination. We do show, however,
that tractability can be retained when reasoning about the top-k and the bottom-k positions for a
fixed k.
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1 Introduction
A central task in social choice is that of winner determination—how to aggregate the
candidate preferences of voters to select the winner. Relevant scenarios may be political
elections, document rankings in search engines, hiring dynamics in the job market, decision
making in multiagent systems, determination of outcomes in sports tournaments, and so
on [5]. Different voting rules can be adopted for this task. The computational social-choice
community has studied in depth the family of the positional scoring rules, where each
voter assigns to each candidate a score based on the candidate’s position in the voter’s
ranking, and then a winner is a candidate who receives the maximal sum of scores. Famous
instantiations of the positional scoring rules include the plurality rule (where a winner is
most frequently ranked first), the veto rule (where a winner is least frequently ranked last),
their generalizations to t-approval and t-veto, respectively, and the Borda rule (where the
score is the actual position in the reverse order).
The seminal work of Konczak and Lang [14] has addressed the situation where voter
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preferences are expressed or known in just a partial manner. More precisely, a partial voting
profile consists of a partial order for each voter, and a completion consists of a linear extension
for each of the partial orders. The framework gives rise to the computational problems of
determining the necessary winners who win in every completion, and the possible winners
who win in at least one completion. In fact, each of these problems has two variants that
correspond to two forms of winning: having a score not smaller than any other candidate
(i.e., being a co-winner) and a having a score strictly greater than all other candidates (i.e.,
being the unique winner). These computational problems are challenging since, conceptually,
they involve reasoning about the entire (exponential-size) space of such completions. The
complexity of these problems has been thoroughly studied in a series of publications that
established the tractability of the necessary winners [24], and a full classification of a general
class of positional scoring rules (the “pure” scoring rules) into tractable and intractable for
the problem of the possible winners [3, 4, 24].
Yet, the outcome of an election often goes beyond just reasoning about the maximal
score. For example, the ranking among the other candidates might determine who will be
the elected parliament members, the entries of the first page of the search engine, the job
candidates to recruit, and the finalists of a sports competition. In the case of a positional
scoring rule, the ranking order is determined by sum of score from voters under some tie-
breaking mechanism [16]. When voter preferences are partial, a candidate can be ranked in
a different positions for every completion, and it is then natural to reason about the range of
these positions. In fact, the aforementioned computational problems can all be phrased as
reasoning about the minimal and maximal ranks under different tie breakers. A candidate c
is a:
possible co-winner if the minimal rank is one when the tie breaker favours c most;
possible unique winner if the minimal rank is one when the tie breaker favours c least;
necessary co-winner if the maximal rank is one when the tie breaker favours c most;
necessary unique winner if the minimal rank is one when the tie breaker favours c least.
We study the computational problems Min{θ} and Max{θ}, where θ is one of the compar-
isons <, > and =. The input consists of a partial profile, a candidate, a tie breaking (total)
order and a number k, and the goal is to determine whether xθk where x is the minimal
rank and the maximal rank, respectively, of the candidate. Our results are summarized in
Table 1. (Recall that “DP” is the class of problems that can be described as the intersection
of a problem in NP and a problem in coNP.)
As the table shows, determining the extremal ranks of a candidate is fundamentally
harder than their k = 1 counterparts (necessary and possible winners). For example, it is
known that detecting the possible winners is NP-hard for every pure rule, with the exception
of plurality and veto where the problem is solvable in polynomial time [3, 4, 24]. In contrast,
we show that determining each of the minimum and maximum ranks is DP-complete for
every positional scoring rule, pure or not, including plurality and veto. In particular, the
tractability of the necessary winners does not extend to reasoning about the maximal rank.
We also study the impact of fixing k and consider the problems Min{θk} and Max{θk}
where the goal is to determine whether xθk where, again, x is the minimal rank and
the maximal rank, respectively, of the candidate. We establish a more positive picture:
tractability for the maximum (assuming that the scores are polynomial in the number of
candidates), and tractability of the minimum under plurality and veto. The degree of the
polynomials depend on k, and we show that this is necessary (under standard assumptions of
parameterized complexity) at least for the case of maximum, where the problem is W[1]-hard
for every positional scoring rule.
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Table 1 Overview of the results. The symbol θ stands for each of <, > and =, and k stands for
m− k + 1 where m is the number of candidates
Problem plurality, veto pure −{pl., veto} non-pure comment
Min{<} NP-c NP-c NP-c
[Thm. 3]Min{>} coNP-c coNP-c coNP-c
Min{=} DP-c DP-c DP-c
Max{<} coNP-c coNP-c coNP-c
[Thm. 4]Max{>} NP-c NP-c NP-c
Max{=} DP-c DP-c DP-c
Min{< k} PW[2]-hard for pl.
NP-c for strongly pure w/
poly. scores ? W[2]: [Thm. 7]
Min{> k} P coNP-c for strongly purew/ poly. scores ?
P: [Thm. 6]
NP, coNP: [Thm. 8]
Min{= k} P NP-hard for strongly purew/ poly. scores ?
Max{θk} PW[1]-hard
P for poly. scores
W[1]-hard
P for poly. scores
W[1]-hard
[Thm. 9]
[Thm. 10]
Min{θk} P P for poly. scores P for poly. scores [Thm. 14]
Max{< k} P coNP-c for strongly purebounded ?
Max{> k} P NP-c for strongly purebounded ?
P: [Cor. 15]
hardness: [Thm. 16]
Max{= k} P NP-hard for strongly purebounded ?
The study of the range of possible ranks, beyond the very top, is related to the problem
of multiwinner election that has been studied mostly in the context of committee selection.
Various utilities have been studied for qualifying selected committee, such as maximizing
the number of voters with approved candidates [1] and, in that spirit, the Condorcet
committees [9,11], aiming at proportional representation via frameworks such as Chamberlin
and Courant’s [8] and Monroe’s [17], and the satisfaction of fairness and diversity constraints [6,
7]. In the case of incomplete voter preferences, the relevant problems are those of detecting the
necessary and possible committee members. Note, however, that the problem of determining
the elected committee can be intractable even if the preferences are complete [9,20,21,23], in
contrast to rank determination (which is always in polynomial time in the framework we
adopt). The problem of multiwinner determination for incomplete votes has been studied by
Lu and Boutilier [15] in a perspective different from pure ranking: find a committee that
minimizes the maximum objection (or “regret”) over all possible completions.
2 Preliminaries
We begin with some notation and terminology.
2.1 Voting Profiles and Positional Scoring Rules
Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be the set of candidates (or alternatives) and let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be
the set of voters. A voting profile T = (T1, . . . , Tn) consists of n linear orders on C, where
each Ti represents the ranking of C by vi.
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A positional scoring rule r is a series {~sm}m∈N+ of m-dimensional score vectors ~sm =
(~sm(1), . . . , ~sm(m)) of natural numbers where ~sm(1) ≥ · · · ≥ ~sm(m) and ~sm(1) > ~sm(m).
We denote ~sm(j) by r(m, j). Some examples of positional scoring rules include the plurality
rule (1, 0, . . . , 0), the t-approval rule (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) that begins with t ones, the veto rule
(1, . . . , 1, 0), the t-veto rule that ends with t zeros, and the Borda rule (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0).
Given a voting profile T = (T1, . . . , Tn), the score s(Ti, c, r) that the voter vi contributes
to the candidate c is r(m, j) where j is the position of c in Ti. The score of c in T is
s(T, c, r) =
∑n
i=1 s(Ti, c, r) or simply s(T, c) if r is clear from context. A candidate c is
a winner (or co-winner) if s(T, c) ≥ s(T, c′) for all candidates c′, and a unique winner if
s(T, c) > s(T, c′) for for all candidates c′ 6= c.
We make standard assumptions about the positional scoring rule r. We assume that
r(m, i) is computable in polynomial time in m. We also assume that the numbers in each
~sm are co-prime (i.e., their greatest common divisor is one).
A positional scoring rule is pure if ~sm+1 is obtained from ~sm by inserting a score at some
position, for all m > 1.
2.2 Partial Profiles
A partial voting profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) consists of n partial orders on set C of candidates,
where each Pi represents the incomplete preference of the voter vi. A completion of P =
(P1, . . . , Pn) is a complete voting profile T = (T1, . . . , Tn) where each Ti is a completion (i.e.,
linear extension) of the partial order Pi. The problems of necessary winners and possible
winners for partial voting preferences were introduced by Konczak and Lang [14].
Given a partial voting profile P, a candidate c ∈ C is a necessary winner if c is a winner
in every completion T of P, and c is a possible winner if there exists a completion T of P
where c is a winner. Similarly, c is a necessary unique winner if c is a unique winner in every
completion T of P, and c is a possible unique winner if there exists a completion T of P
where c is a unique winner.
The decision problems associated to a positional scoring rule r are those of determining,
given a partial profile P and a candidate c, whether c is a necessary winner, a necessary
unique winner, a possible winner, and a possible unique winner. We denote these problems
by NW, NU, PW and PU, respectively. A classification of the complexity of these problems
has been established in a sequence of publications.
I Theorem 1 (Classification Theorem [3, 4, 24]). Each of NW and NU can be solved in
polynomial time for every positional scoring rule. Each of PW and PU is solvable in
polynomial time for plurality and veto; for all other pure scoring rules, PW and PU are
NP-complete.
In this paper, we aim towards generalizing the Classification Theorem to determine the
minimal and maximal ranks, as we formalize next.
2.3 Minimal and Maximal Ranks
The rank of a candidate is its position in the list of candidates, sorted by the sum of scores
from the voters. However, for a precise definition, we need to resolve potential ties. Formally,
let r be a positional scoring rule, C be a set of candidates, T a voting profile, and τ a tie
breaker, which is simply a linear order over C. Let RT be the linear order on C that sorts
the candidates by their scores and then by τ; that is,
RT := {c  c′ : s(T, c) > s(T, c′)} ∪ {c  c′ : s(T, c) = s(T, c′) ∧ c τ c′} .
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The rank of c is the position of c in RT, and we denote it by rank(c |T, τ). If T is replaced
with a partial voting profile P, then we define ranks(c |P, τ) as the set of ranks that c gets
in the different completions of P:
ranks(c |P, τ) := {rank(c |T, τ) | T extends P}
The minimal and maximal positions in ranks(c | P, τ) are denoted by min(c | P, τ) and
max(c |P, τ), respectively.
Observe the following for a partial profile P and a candidate c:
c is a possible winner if and only if min(c |P, τ) = 1 for any tie breaker τ that positions c
first.
c is a possible unique winner if and only if min(c |P, τ) = 1 for any tie breaker τ that
positions c last.
c is a necessary winner if and only if max(c |P, τ) = 1 for any tie breaker τ that positions
c first.
c is a necessary unique winner if and only if max(c |P, τ) = 1 for any tie breaker τ that
positions c last.
To investigate the computational complexity of calculating the minimal and maximal
ranks for a scoring rule r, we will consider the decision problems of determining, given P,
c, τ and a position k, whether X(c |P, τ) θ k where X is one of min and max and θ is one
of <, >, =. We denote these problems by Minr{θ} and Maxr{θ}. Moreover, we will omit
the rule r when it is clear from the context. For example, Minr{<} (or just Min{<}) is the
decision problem of determining whether min(c |P, τ) < k, and Maxr{=} (or just Max{=})
decides whether max(c |P, τ) = k.
2.4 Additional Notation.
We use the following notation. For a set A and a partition A1, . . . , At of A:
P (A1, . . . , At) denotes the partitioned partial order {a1  · · ·  at : ∀i ∈ [t], ai ∈ Ai}.
O(A1, . . . , At) denotes an arbitrary linear order on A that completes P (A1, . . . , At).
A linear order a1  · · ·  at is also denoted as a vector (a1, . . . , at). The concatenation
(a1, . . . , at) ◦ (b1, . . . , b`) is (a1, . . . , at, b1, . . . , b`).
3 Complexity of Minimum and Maximum Ranks
In this section, we show that the problems we study are computationally hard for all positional
scoring rules. We begin with a lemma that is proved by combining some well known results.
I Lemma 2. The following problems are DP-complete: Given a cubic graph G and k,
determine whether
the largest independent set of G has size exactly k;
the smallest vertex cover of G has size exactly k.
Proof. First, the problems of deciding whether a graph contains an independent set (resp.
vertex cover) of size k is known to be NP-complete for cubic graphs [19]. By a straightforward
reduction, we get that deciding whether a graph contains a clique of size k is NP-complete
for graphs G = (U,E) where deg(u) = |E| − 3 for every u ∈ U . Determining whether the
largest clique has size exactly k in such graphs can be shown to be DP-complete using the
same proof of Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [18] that exact clique is DP-complete. Then,
using the standard reductions from cliques to independent sets and from cliques to vertex
covers, we can deduce the DP-completeness for the two problems of the lemma. J
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Voter 1 2 · · · `− 1 `, `+ 1 `+ 2 · · · n+ 2
P 1e (i) c1 c2 · · · c`−1 {u,w} c` · · · cn
P 1e (2) c2 c3 · · · c` {u,w} c`+1 · · · c1
...
P 1e (n) cn c1 · · · c`−2 {u,w} c`−1 · · · cn−1
Figure 1 The voters of the profile P1e = (P 1e (1), . . . , P 1e (n)) for the edge e = {u,w} used in the
proof of Theorem 3. The other candidates are denoted as C \ U = {c1, . . . , cn}.
The following theorems state the hardness of computing the minimal and maximal
rank for all positional scoring rules. We begin with Minr{<} and Minr{=}. Note that the
NP-completeness of Min{<} immediately implies the coNP-completeness of Min{>}.
I Theorem 3. For every positional scoring rule r, Minr{<} is NP-complete and Minr{=}
is DP-complete.
Proof. Memberships in the corresponding classes (NP and DP) are straightforward. We
show hardness for Minr{=} by a reduction from vertex cover in cubic graphs, which is
DP-complete by Lemma 2. This reduction also shows the NP-hardness of Minr{<}.
Let r be a positional scoring rule, and denote r by {~sm}m>1. Assume, w.l.o.g., that
~sm(m) = 0 for every m > 1. (Otherwise, we can subtract ~sm(m) from all the entries in
the vector without affecting the ranks in any profile.) Let G = (U,E) be a cubic graph
with U = {u1, . . . , un}. We construct an instance (C,P, τ) under r. The candidate set is
C = U ∪ {c∗, d} and the tie breaker is τ = O({c∗, d} , U). The voting profile P = P1 ◦T2 is
the concatenation of two parts P1 and T2 that we describe next.
Note that |C| = n+ 2. Let ` < n+ 2 be an index such that ~sn+2(`) > ~sn+2(`+ 1) = 0.
We know that such an ` exists due to the definition of a scoring rule and our assumption
that ~sm(m) = 0 for every m > 1.
The first part of the profile contains a profile for every edge P1 =
{
P1e
}
e∈E . For every
edge e = {u,w} ∈ E, the profile P1e = (P 1e (1), . . . , P 1e (n)) consists of n voters, as illustrated
in Figure 1. For every i ∈ [n], denote Mi(C \ e) = (ci1 , . . . , cin) where Mi is the ith circular
vote as defined by Baumeister, Roos and Jörg [2]:
Mi(a1, . . . , at) := (ai, ai+1, . . . , at, a1, a2, . . . , ai−1) .
The ith voter in P1e is
P 1e (i) =
(
ci1 , ci2 , . . . , ci`−1 , {u,w} , ci` , cit+1 , . . . , cin
)
.
Voter 1 2 · · · `− 1 ` `+ 1 `+ 2 · · · n+ 2
T 21 u1 u2 · · · u`−1 d c∗ u` · · · un
T 22 u2 u3 · · · u` d c∗ u`+1 · · · u1
...
T 2n un u1 · · · u`−2 d c∗ u`−1 · · · un−1
Figure 2 The voters of the profile (T 21 , . . . , T 2n) used in the proof of Theorem 3.
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This means that in P1e, the candidates u and w can only be at positions ` and `+ 1, and the
other candidates are circulating at all other positions.
The second part of the profile, T2, consists of three copies of the profile (T 21 , . . . , T 2n), as
illustrated in Figure 2. For every i ∈ [n], denote Mi(U) = (ci1 , . . . , cin) and define
T 2i = (ci1 , ci2 , . . . , ci`−1 , d, c∗, ci` , cit+1 , . . . , cin) .
This means that d and c∗ are always at positions ` and `+1, respectively, and the candidates
of U are circulating at all other positions.
This completes the construction of (C,P, τ). Next, we state some observations. Let
T = T1 ◦T2 be a completion of P where T1 = {T1e}e∈E .
The scores of c∗ and d in T1 are
s(T1, c∗) = s(T1, d) =
∑
e∈E
s(T1e, d) = |E|
∑
i 6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) .
For every u ∈ U , denote by E(u) the set of edges incident to u, and denote E(u) = E \E(u).
Recall that |E(u)| = 3 since the graph is cubic. By definition, it holds that
s(T1, u) =
∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) +
∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) .
Observe that∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) ≤ 3n · ~sn+2(`)
and that∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) = (|E| − 3)
∑
i 6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) .
In T2, the score of c∗ is s(T2, c∗) = 3n · ~sn+2(`+ 1) = 0 and the score of d is s(T2, d) =
3n · ~sn+2(`). For every u ∈ U , s(T2, u) = 3
∑
i6=`,`+1 ~sn+2(i).
Overall,
s(T, c∗) = s(T1, c∗) + s(T2, c∗) = |E|
∑
i6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) + 0 = |E|
∑
i 6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) (1)
s(T, d) = s(T1, d) + s(T2, d) = |E|
∑
i6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) + 3n · ~sn+2(`) (2)
and for every u ∈ U ,
s(T, u) = s(T1, u) + s(T2, u) =
∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) +
∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) + s(T2, u)
=
∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) + (|E| − 3)
∑
i 6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) + 3
∑
i6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i)
=
∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) + |E|
∑
i 6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) (3)
≤ 3n · ~sn+2(`) + |E|
∑
i 6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) = s(T, d) (4)
XX:8 Computing the Extremal Possible Ranks with Incomplete Preferences
Voter 1 2 · · · `− 1 ` `+ 1 `+ 2 · · · n n+ 1 n+ 2
T 31 u1 u2 · · · u`−1 u` u`+1 u`+2 · · · un d c∗
T 32 u2 u3 · · · u` u`+1 u`+2 u`+3 · · · d c∗ u1
...
T 3n−`+1 un−`+1 un−`+2 · · · un−1 un d c∗ · · · un−`−2 un−`−1 un−`
T 3n−`+2 un−`+2 un−`+3 · · · un c∗ d u1 · · · un−`−1 un−` un−`+1
T 3n−`+3 un−`+3 un−`+4 · · · d c∗ u1 u2 · · · un−` un−`+1 un−`+2
...
T 3n+2 c
∗ u1 · · · u`−2 u`−1 u` u`+1 · · · un−1 un d
Figure 3 The voters of the profile (T 31 , . . . , T 3n+2) used in the proof of Theorem 4.
From Equations (2) and (4) and the definition of τ we conclude that d always defeats all
other candidates. From Equations (1) and (3) we conclude that c∗ defeats u if and only if∑
e∈E(u) s(T1e, u) = 0.
Denote by α(G) the minimal size of a vertex cover in G. The following two claims show
that for any k, min(c∗ |P, τ) ≤ k+2 if and only if α(G) ≤ k, which implies NP-completeness
for Minr{<}.
B Claim. If α(G) ≤ k then min(c∗ |P, τ) ≤ k + 2.
Proof. Assume that α(G) ≤ k, and let B be a vertex cover of size at most k in G. Consider
the following completion T =
{
T1e
}
e∈E ◦T2 of P. For every e = {u,w} ∈ E, recall that only
the positions of u and w are not determined in the voters of P1e.
If u ∈ B, then in all voters of T1e the candidate u is placed at the `th position and w is
placed at the (`+ 1)th position.
Otherwise, w ∈ B (since B is a vertex cover), and then in all voters of T1e the candidate
w is placed at the `th position and u is placed at the (`+ 1)th position.
So, for every u /∈ B the candidate u is placed at the (` + 1)th position in all voters
of
{
T1e
}
e∈E(u), hence
∑
e∈E(u) s(T1e, u) = 0 and c∗ defeats u. These are at least n − k
candidates which c∗ defeats, therefore rank(c∗ |T, τ) ≤ k+2 and min(c∗ |P, τ) ≤ k+2. C
B Claim. If min(c∗ |P, τ) ≤ k + 2 then α(G) ≤ k.
Proof. Assume that min(c∗ |P, τ) ≤ k + 2, and let T = {T1e}e∈E ◦T2 be a completion of P
where rank(c∗ |T, τ) ≤ k + 2. Let B ⊆ U be the candidates of U that defeat c∗ in T, we
know that |B| ≤ k because d always defeats c∗.
For every e = {u,w} ∈ E, all voters of T1e placed a vertex from B at the `th position. (If
a vertex from U \B is placed at the `th position for some voter, then this vertex defeats c∗,
in contradiction to the definition of B.) Since these voters can only place u and w at the
`th position, we get that either u ∈ B or w ∈ B. Hence B is a vertex cover, which implies
α(G) ≤ k. C
Finally, observe thatmin(c∗ |P, τ) = α(G)+2 (by choosing k = α(G) and k = min(c∗ |P, τ)−2
in the two claims), which implies DP-completeness for Minr{=}. J
The next theorem states the hardness of Maxr{>} and Maxr{=}. Note that the NP-
completeness of Max{>} immediately implies the coNP-completeness of Max{<}.
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I Theorem 4. For every positional scoring rule r, Maxr{>} is NP-complete and Maxr{=}
is DP-complete.
Proof. Memberships in the corresponding classes (NP and DP) are straightforward. We
show hardness for Maxr{=} by a reduction from independent set in cubic graphs, which is
DP-complete by Lemma 2. This reduction also shows hardness for Maxr{>}, and uses some
parts from the reduction of the proof of Theorem 3.
Let r be a positional scoring rule, and denote r by {~sm}m>1. Assume, w.l.o.g., that
~sm(m) = 0 for every m > 1. Let G = (U,E) be a cubic graph with U = {u1, . . . , un}. We
construct an instance (C,P, τ) under r. The candidates set is C = U ∪ {c∗, d} and the tie
breaker is τ = O(U, {c∗, d}). The voting profile is the concatenation P = P1 ◦T2 ◦T3 of
three parts described next.
Note that |C| = n+ 2. Let ` < n+ 2 be an index such that ~sn+2(`) > ~sn+2(`+ 1) = 0.
The first two parts P1 =
{
P1e
}
e∈E and T
2 are the same as in the proof of Theorem 3. The
third part, T3, consists of 3n copies of the profile (T 31 , . . . , T 3n+2), as illustrated in Figure 3.
We start with T 3i = Mi(u1, . . . , un, d, c∗) for the circular votes as defined in the proof of
Theorem 3, and then perform the following change. There exists some i ∈ [n+ 2] such that
d and c∗ are placed at position ` and ` + 1, respectively, in T 3i . In this voter, switch the
positions of d and c∗. This means that in (T 31 , . . . , T 3n+2), the candidate c∗ is placed at the
`th position twice, and d is placed at the (`+ 1)th position twice.
Since ~sn+2(` + 1) = 0, observe that s(T3, c∗) = 3n
(∑n+2
i=1 ~sn+2(i) + ~sn+2(`)
)
and
s(T3, d) = 3n
(∑n+2
i=1 ~sn+2(i)− ~sn+2(`)
)
. For every u ∈ U we have that s(T3, u) =
3n
∑n+2
i=1 ~sn+2(i). By combining this with the observations from the proof of Theorem 3, we
get that for every completion T =
{
T1e
}
e∈E ◦T2 ◦T3 of P, the following holds. The score
of c∗ is given by
s(T, c∗) = s(T1, c∗) + s(T2, c∗) + s(T3, c∗)
=
|E| ∑
i6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i)
+ 0 +(3n n+2∑
i=1
~sn+2(i) + 3n · ~sn+2(`)
)
= |E|
∑
i 6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) + 3n
n+2∑
i=1
~sn+2(i) + 3n · ~sn+2(`) .
The score of d is given by
s(T, d) = s(T1, d) + s(T2, d) + s(T3, d)
=
|E| ∑
i6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i)
+ (3n · ~sn+2(`)) +(3n n+2∑
i=1
~sn+2(i)− 3n · ~sn+2(`)
)
= |E|
∑
i 6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) + 3n
n+2∑
i=1
~sn+2(i) .
XX:10 Computing the Extremal Possible Ranks with Incomplete Preferences
The score of every u ∈ U is given by
s(T, u) =
∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) +
 ∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) + s(T2, u)
+ s(T3, u)
=
∑
e∈E(u)
s(T1e, u) + |E|
∑
i 6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) + 3n
n+2∑
i=1
~sn+2(i)
≤ 3n · ~sn+2(`) + |E|
∑
i 6=`,`+1
~sn+2(i) + 3n
n+2∑
i=1
~sn+2(i)
= s(T, c∗) .
By this analysis and the definition of τ, d is always defeated by all other candidates,
and u defeats c∗ if and only if
∑
e∈E(u) s(T1e, u) = 3n · ~sn+2(`). Denote the maximal
size of an independent set in G by β(G). The following two claims show that for any k,
max(c∗ |P, τ) ≥ k + 1 if and only if β(G) ≥ k, which implies NP-completeness for Maxr{>}.
B Claim. If β(G) ≥ k then max(c∗ |P, τ) ≥ k + 1.
Proof. Assume that β(G) ≥ k, let B be an independent set of size at least k in G. Consider
a completion T =
{
T1e
}
e∈E ◦T2 ◦T3 of P as follows. For every e = {u,w} ∈ E, recall that
only the positions of u,w are not determined in the voters of P1e. If u,w /∈ B then complete
all voters of P1e arbitrarily. If u ∈ B then in all voters of T1e, u is placed at the `th position
and w is placed at the (` + 1)th position. Finally, if w ∈ B then in all voters of T1e, w is
placed at the `th position and u is placed at the (`+ 1)th position. Note that we cannot
have u,w ∈ B because B is an independent set.
For every u ∈ B, u is placed at the `th position in all voters of {T1e}e∈E(u), hence∑
e∈E(u) s(T1e, u) = 3n · ~sn+2(`) and u defeats c∗. These are at least k candidates which
defeat c∗, therefore rank(c∗ |T, τ) ≥ k + 1 and max(c∗ |P, τ) ≥ k + 1. C
B Claim. If max(c∗ |P, τ) ≥ k + 1 then β(G) ≥ k.
Proof. Assume that max(c∗ |P, τ) ≥ k+1, there exists a completion T = {T1e}e∈E◦T2◦T3 of
P where rank(c∗ |T, τ) ≥ k+1. Let B be the candidates which defeat c∗ in T. B ⊆ U because
c∗ always defeats d, and |B| ≥ k. For every u ∈ B we get that∑e∈E(u) s(T1e, u) = 3n·~sn+2(`),
otherwise u does not defeat c∗.
Assume to the contrary that e = {u,w} ∈ B for some pair u,w ∈ B. In the voters of T1e,
both u and w should be placed at the `th position, that is a contradiction. Hence B is an
independent set, which implies β(G) ≥ k. C
Finally, observe thatmax(c∗|P, τ) = β(G)+1 (by choosing k = β(G) and k = max(c∗|P, τ)−1
in the two claims), which implies DP-completeness for Maxr{=}. J
4 Comparison to a Bounded Rank
In the previous section, we established that the problems of computing the minimal and
maximal ranks are very often intractable. We now investigate the complexity of comparing
the minimal and maximal ranks to some fixed rank k. Hence, the input consists of only P, c
and τ, but not k. We denote these problems by Minr{θk} and Maxr{θk} where, as usual,
θ is one of <, >, =. Again, we will omit the rule r when it is clear from the context. For
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example, Min{<k} is the decision problem of determining whether min(c | P, τ) < k, and
Max{=k} decides whether max(c |P, τ) = k.
We will show that the complexity picture for Min{=k} and Max{=k} is way more positive,
as we generalize the tractability of almost all of the tractable scoring rules for NW and
PW. We will also generalize hardness results from PW to Min{=k}; interestingly, this
generalization turns out to be quite nontrivial.
In addition to comparing to the fixed k, we will consider the problem of comparing to
k := m− k+1 where m is, as usual, the number of candidates. Note that for k = {1, . . . ,m},
the position k is the kth rank from the end (bottom). Hence, Max{>k} is the problem of
deciding whether the candidate can end up in the bottom k − 1 positions.
4.1 Complexity of Min{θk}
We begin with the problems of Min{θk} and focus first on the plurality and veto rules.
4.1.1 Plurality and Veto
We first show that the positional scoring rules that are tractable for PW, namely plurality
and veto, are also tractable for Min{θk}. This is done by a lemma which uses a reduction
to the problem of polygamous matching [13]: Given a bipartite graph G = (U ∪W,E) and
natural numbers αw ≤ βw for all w ∈ W , determine whether there is a subset of E where
each u ∈ U is incident to exactly one edge and every w ∈W is incident to at least αw edges
and at most βw edges. This problem is known to be solvable in polynomial time [10,22].
I Lemma 5. The following decision problem can be solved in polynomial time for the plurality
and veto rules: given a partial profile P over a set C of candidates and numbers γc ≤ δc for
every candidate c, is there a completion T such that γc ≤ s(T, c) ≤ δc for every c ∈ C?
Proof. For both rules, we apply a reduction to polygamous matching, where U = V (the set
of voters) and W = C. For plurality, E connects vi ∈ V and c ∈ C whenever c can be in the
top position in one or more completions of Pi, and the bounds are αc = γc and βc = δc. For
veto, receiving a score s is equivalent to being placed in the bottom position of n− s voters,
so E connects vi ∈ V and c ∈ C whenever c can be in the bottom position in one or more
completions of Pi. The bounds are αc = n− δc and βc = n− γc. J
To solve Min{<k} (Min{>k} and Min{=k} immediately follow) given C, P, τ and c,
we search for a completion where c defeats more than m− k candidates. For this goal we
consider every set D ⊆ C \ {c} of size m− k + 1 and search for a completion where c defeats
all candidates of D. For that, we iterate over every integer score 0 ≤ s ≤ n and use Lemma 5
to test whether there exists a completion T such that s(T, c) ≥ s, and for every d ∈ D we
have s(T, d) ≤ s if c τ d or s(T, d) < s otherwise. Hence, we conclude that:
I Theorem 6. For every fixed k ≥ 1, Min{θk} is solvable in polynomial time under the
plurality and veto rules, where θ is one of <, >, =.
The polynomial degree in Theorem 6 depends on k. The following result shows that this is
unavoidable, at least for the plurality rule, under conventional assumptions in parameterized
complexity.
I Theorem 7. Under the plurality rule, Min{<} is W[2]-hard for the parameter k.
XX:12 Computing the Extremal Possible Ranks with Incomplete Preferences
Proof. We show an FPT reduction from the dominating set problem, which is the following:
Given an undirected graph G = (U,E) and an integer k, is there a set D ⊆ U of size k such
that every vertex is either in D or adjacent to some vertex in D? This problem is known to
be W[2]-hard for the parameter k.
Given a graph (U,E) with U = {u1, . . . , un}, we construct an instance for Min{<} under
plurality where the candidates are C = U ∪ {c∗}, the tie breaker is τ = O({c∗} , U), and the
voting profile is P = (P1, . . . , Pn). Let N(ui) be the set of neighbours of ui in the graph, and
let N [ui] = N(ui) ∪ {ui}. For all i ∈ [n] we have Pi := P (N [ui], U \N [ui], {c∗}). Hence, the
ith voter can vote only for vertices that dominate ui. To complete, we show that the graph
has a dominating set of size k if and only if min(c∗ |P, τ) < k + 2.
Suppose there is a dominating set D of size k, consider the profile T = (T1, . . . , Tn) where
for every i ∈ [n],
Ti := O(N [ui] ∩D,N [ui] \D,U \N [ui], {c∗}) .
In this completion, for each u /∈ D we get s(T, u) = 0. These are n − k candidates
that c∗ defeats, therefore rank(c∗ | T, τ) < k + 2 (at most k candidates defeat c∗) and
min(c∗ | P, τ) < k + 2. Conversely, if min(c∗ | P, τ) < k + 2 then in some completion T it
defeats at least n− k candidates, and these candidates have a score 0 in T. Let D be the set
of candidates that c∗ does not defeat in T, all voters voted for candidates in D and |D| ≤ k.
A voter Pi can only vote for vertices which dominate ui, hence D is a dominating set of size
at most k. J
4.1.2 Beyond Plurality and Veto
The Classification Theorem (Theorem 1) states that PW is intractable for every pure scoring
rule r other than plurality or veto. While this hardness easily generalizes to Minr{=k} for
k = 1, it is not at all clear how to generalize it to any k > 1. In particular, we cannot
see how to reduce PW to Minr{=k} while assuming only the purity of the rule. We can,
however, show such a reduction under a stronger notion of purity, as long as the scores are
bounded by a polynomial in the number m of candidates. In this case, we say that the rule
has polynomial scores. Note that this assumption is in addition to our usual assumption that
the scores can be computed in polynomial time.
A rule r is strongly pure if the score sequence for m + 1 candidates is obtained from
the score sequence for m candidates by inserting a new score, either to beginning or the
end of the sequence. More formally, r = {~sm}m∈N+ is strongly pure if for all m ≥ 1, either
~sm+1 = ~sm+1(1) ◦ ~sm or ~sm+1 = ~sm ◦ ~sm+1(m+ 1). Note that t-approval, t-veto and Borda
are all strongly pure.
I Theorem 8. Suppose that the positional scoring rule is strongly pure, has polynomial
scores, and is neither plurality nor veto. Then Min{<k} is NP-complete and Min{=k} is
NP-hard for all fixed k ≥ 1.
Proof. Let r be a positional scoring rule that satisfies the conditions of the theorem, and
let us denote r by {~sm}m>1. We use a reduction from PW under r. Consider the input
P = (P1, . . . , Pn) and c for PW over a set C of m candidates. Let m′ = m+ k − 1. Since r
is strongly pure, there is an index t ≤ k − 1 such that
~sm′ = (~sm′(1), . . . , ~sm′(t)) ◦ ~sm ◦ (~sm′(t+m+ 1), . . . , ~sm′(m′)) .
That is, ~sm′ is obtained from ~sm by inserting t values at the top coordinates and k − 1− t
values at the bottom coordinates. We define C ′, P′ and τ′ as follows. The candidates are
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Voter 1 2 · · · k − 1 k k + 1 · · · k +m− 1
M1,1 d1 d2 . . . dk−1 c1 c2 · · · cm
M1,2 d1 d2 . . . dk−1 c2 c3 · · · c1
...
M1,m d1 d2 . . . dk−1 cm c1 · · · cm−1
M2,1 d2 d3 . . . d1 c1 c2 · · · cm
M2,2 d2 d3 . . . d1 c2 c3 · · · c1
...
M2,m d2 d3 . . . d1 cm c1 · · · cm−1
...
Mk−1,1 dk−1 d1 . . . dk−2 c1 c2 · · · cm
Mk−1,2 dk−1 d1 . . . dk−2 c2 c3 · · · c1
...
Mk−1,m dk−1 d1 . . . dk−2 cm c1 · · · cm−1
Figure 4 The voters Mi,j used in the proof of Theorem 8.
C ′ = C ∪D1 ∪D2 where D1 = {d1, . . . , dt} and D2 = {dt+1, . . . , dk−1}, denote D = D1 ∪D2.
The tie breaker is τ′ = O(D, {c} , C \ {c}). The profile P′ is the concatenation Q ◦M of two
partial profiles. The first is Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn), where Qi is the same as Pi, except that the
candidates of D1 are placed at the top positions and the candidates of D2 are placed at the
bottom positions. Formally, Qi := Pi ∪ P (D1, C,D2). The second, M, consists of n · ~sm′(1)
copies of the profile
{Mi,j}i=1,...,k−1 , j=1,...,m
where Mi,j is Mi(D)◦Mj(C) for the circular votes Mi(D) and Mj(C) as defined in the proof
of Theorem 3.
We show that the candidates of D always defeat all other candidates. For every d ∈ D,
the score of d inM is s(M, d) = n · ~sm′(1) ·m
∑k−1
i=1 ~sm′(i), and for every c′ ∈ C the score in
M is
s(M, c′) = n · ~sm′(1) · (k − 1)
m′∑
i=k
~sm′(i) ≤ n · ~sm′(1) ·
(
m
k−1∑
i=1
~sm′(i)− 1
)
= s(M, d)− n · ~sm′(1)
where the inequality is due to the assumption that ~sm′(1) > ~sm′(m′). Let T′ be a completion
of P′, the total score of c′ is
s(T′, c′) ≤ n · ~sm′(1) + s(M, c′) ≤ n · ~sm′(1) + s(M, d)− n · ~sm′(1) ≤ s(T′, d) .
Since the candidates of D are the first candidates in τ′, they always defeat the candidates of
C. We show that c is a possible winner for P if and only if min(c | P′, τ′) = k. Since the
candidates of D are always the first k−1 candidates, this is equivalent to min(c|P′, τ′) < k+1.
Let T = (T1, . . . Tn) be a completion of P where c is a winner. Consider the completion
T′ = (T ′1, . . . T ′n) ◦M of P′ where T ′i = O(D1) ◦ Ti ◦O(D2). For every c′ ∈ C, we know that
XX:14 Computing the Extremal Possible Ranks with Incomplete Preferences
s(T′, d) ≥ s(T′, c′) for every d ∈ D, and from the property of ~sm′ we get that
s(T′, c′) = s(T, c′) + n · ~sm′(1) · (k − 1)
m′∑
i=k
~sm′(i) .
From the choice of τ′, c defeats all candidates of C \ {c} in T′, hence rank(c | T′, τ′) = k.
Conversely, let T′ = (T ′1, . . . T ′n) ◦M be a completion of P′ where rank(c |T′, τ′) = k, define
a completion T of P by removing D from all orders in (T ′1, . . . T ′n). For every c′ ∈ C we have
s(T, c′) = s(T′, c′)− n · ~sm′(1) · (k − 1)
m′∑
i=k
~sm′(i)
hence c is a winner in T. J
4.2 Complexity of Max{θk}
We prove that for any fixed k, Max{θk} is tractable for every positional scoring rule (pure or
not) with polynomial scores.
I Theorem 9. For all fixed k ≥ 1 and positional scoring rules r with polynomial scores,
Maxr{θk} is solvable in polynomial time where θ is one of <, >, =.
Note that all of the specific rules mentioned so far (i.e., t-approval, t-veto, Borda and so
on) have polynomial scores, and hence, are covered by Theorem 9. An example of a rule
that is not covered is the rule defined by r(m, j) = 2m−j .
The polynomial degree in Theorem 9 depends on k. This is unavoidable under conventional
assumptions in parameterized complexity. This is shown by the proof of Theorem 4 that
gives an FPT reduction from the problem of independent set in cubic graphs problem, which
is W[1]-hard for the parameter k, to Max{>}. Therefore:
I Theorem 10. For every positional scoring rule, Max{>} is W[1]-hard for the parameter k.
In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 9. We show that Max{>k} is in
polynomial time, which immediately implies that Max{=k} and Max{<k} are in polynomial
time. To determine whether max(c |P, τ) > k, we search for k candidates that defeat c in
some completion T, since rank(c |T, τ) > k if and only if at least k candidates defeat c in T.
For that, we iterate over every subset {c1, . . . , ck} ⊆ C \ {c} and determine whether these
k + 1 candidates can get a combination of scores where c1, . . . , ck all defeat c.
More formally, let C be a set of candidates and r a positional scoring rule. For a partial
profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) and a sequence S = (c1, . . . , cq) of candidates from C, we denote
by pi(P, S) the set of all possible scores that the candidates in S can obtain jointly in a
completion:
pi(P, S) := {(s(T, c1), . . . , s(T, cq)) | T completes P}
Note that pi(P, S) ⊆ {0, . . . , n · ~sm(1)}q. When P consists of a single voter P , we write
pi(P, S) instead of pi(P, S). To show that max(c|P, τ) > k we need a sequence S = (c1, . . . , cq)
where q = k + 1 and cq = c, and a sequence (s1, . . . , sq) ∈ pi(P, S) such that each ci beats c
when for i = 1, . . . , k the score of ci is s(ci) = si and s(c) = sq. The following two lemmas
show that, indeed, if such sequences exist, we can find them in polynomial time.
I Lemma 11. Let q be a fixed number and r a positional scoring rule. Whether (s1, . . . , sq) ∈
pi(P, S) can be determined in polynomial time, given a partial order P over a set of candidates,
a sequence S of q candidates, and scores s1, . . . , sq.
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Proof. We use a reduction to a scheduling problem where tasks have execution times, release
times, deadlines, and precedence constraints (i.e., task x should be completed before starting
task y). This scheduling problem can be solved in polynomial time [12]. In the reduction,
each candidate c is a task with a unit execution time. For every ci in S, the release time is
min {j ∈ [n] : r(m, j) = si}, and the deadline is 1+max {j ∈ [n] : r(m, j) = si}. For the rest
of the candidates, the release time is 1 and the deadline is m+1. The precedence constraints
are P . It holds that (s1, . . . , sq) ∈ pi(P, S) if and only if the tasks can be scheduled according
to all the requirements. J
From Lemma 11 we can conclude that when q is fixed and r has polynomial scores, we
can construct pi(P, S) in polynomial time, via straightforward dynamic programming.
I Lemma 12. Let q be a fixed natural number and r a positional scoring rule with polynomial
scores. The set pi(P, S) can be constructed in polynomial time, given a partial profile P and
a sequence S of q candidates.
Proof. First, for every i ∈ [n], construct pi(Pi, S) by applying Lemma 11. Then, given
pi((P1, . . . , Pi), S), observe that
pi((P1, . . . , Pi+1), S) = {~u+ ~w : ~u ∈ pi((P1, . . . , Pi), S), ~w ∈ pi(Pi+1, S)}
where ~u+ ~w is a point-wise sum of the two vectors (~u+ ~w)(j) = ~u(j) + ~w(j). Hence, pi(P, S)
can be constructed in polynomial time. J
4.3 Complexity of Min{θk}
Recall that k := m − k + 1. We now show that the problem of Min{θk} is tractable for
every positional scoring rule with polynomial scores. This is surprising because Min{=1}
is NP-complete for every pure positional scoring rule other than plurality and veto, by a
reduction from PW.
Given a binary positional scoring rule r and functions a, b : N+ → N+, we define the
(a, b)-reversed scoring rule, denoted ra,b, to be the one given by ra,b(m, i) = a(m)− b(m) ·
r(m,m+ 1− i). For example, the (1, 1)-reversed rule of plurality is veto, and more generally,
the (1, 1)-reversed rule of t-approval is t-veto. Also, the (m, 1)-reversed rule of Borda is
Borda. In the following lemma, we use a generalized notation for our decision problems
where instead of fixed k or k we use a fixed function f , which is applied to the number m of
candidates to produce a number f(m).
I Lemma 13. Let r be a positional scoring rule r and let f, a, b : N+ → N+. Define
f ′(m) = m+ 1− f(m), there exists a reduction
1. from Minr{<f} to Maxra,b{>f ′};
2. from Maxr{>f} to Minra,b{<f ′};
3. from Minr{=f} to Maxra,b{=f ′};
4. from Maxr{=f} to Minra,b{=f ′}.
Proof. For a partial order P , the reversed order is defined by PR := {x  y : (y  x) ∈ P}.
Note that T extends P if and only if TR extends PR. Given (C,P, τ) as input under r with
P = (P1, ..., Pn), consider (C,P′, τR) under rR where P′ = (PR1 , ..., PRn ).
Let T = (T1, ..., Tn) be a completion of P, observe the completion T′ = (TR1 , ..., TRn )
of P′. For every candidate c and a voter vi we get s(TRi , c, ra,b) = a(m)− b(m) · s(Ti, c, r)
so overall s(T′, c, ra,b) = n · a(m) − b(m) · s(T, c, r). Since the tie-breaking order is also
reversed, the rank is rank(c | T′, τR) = m + 1 − rank(c | T, τ). In same way, if T′ is
XX:16 Computing the Extremal Possible Ranks with Incomplete Preferences
a completion of P′ then by reversing the orders we get a completion T of P such that
rank(c |T, τ) = m+ 1− rank(c |T′, τR) for every c ∈ C. We can deduce that
1. min(c |P, τ) < f(m) if and only if max(c |P′, τR) > f ′(m);
2. max(c |P, τ) > f(m) if and only if min(c |P′, τR) < f ′(m);
3. min(c |P, τ) = f(m) if and only if max(c |P′, τR) = f ′(m);
4. max(c |P, τ) = f(m) if and only if min(c |P′, τR) = f ′(m).
From the above points we conclude the parts of the lemma, respectively. J
I Theorem 14. Min{θk} is solvable in polynomial time for every fixed k ≥ 1, positional
scoring rules r with polynomial scores, and θ one of <, >, and =.
Proof. Let r be a positional scoring rule with polynomial scores, and denote r by {~sm}m>1.
Define the functions a(m) = ~sm(1), b(m) = 1, and observe ra,b. For any m > 1, the vector
for ra,b is
(~sm(1)− ~sm(m), ~sm(1)− ~sm(m− 1), . . . , ~sm(1)− ~sm(2), ~sm(1)− ~sm(1))
therefore ra,b is also with polynomial scores. For any fixed k, Maxra,b{θk} is solvable in
polynomial time by Theorem 9. Then, by Lemma 13, Minr{θk} is solvable in polynomial
time. J
4.4 Complexity of Max{θk}
First, for plurality and veto, by Theorem 6 and Lemma 13, we can deduce the following:
I Corollary 15. For every fixed k ≥ 1, Max{θk} is solvable in polynomial time under the
plurality and veto rules, where θ is one of <, > and =.
A positional scoring rule r is p-valued, where p is a positive integer greater than 1, if there
exists a positive integer m0 such that for all m ≥ m0, the scoring vector ~sm of r contains
exactly p distinct values. A rule is bounded if it is p-valued for some p > 1. Note that for
a pure bounded rule there exists some constant t such that for every m, the values in ~sm
are at most t because for every m > m0, the vector ~sm cannot contains values which do not
appear in ~sm0 .
I Theorem 16. Suppose that a positional scoring rule r is bounded, strongly pure, and is
neither plurality nor veto. Then Maxr{>k} is NP-complete and Maxr{=k} is NP-hard for
all fixed k ≥ 1.
Proof. Let r be a positional scoring rule that satisfies the conditions of the theorem, and let
us denote r by {~sm}m>1. Since r is bounded and strongly pure, there exists some constant t
such that for every m, the values in ~sm are at most t. Observe the scoring rule r′ = rt,1. For
every m ≥ 1, if ~sm+1 = ~sm+1(1) ◦ ~sm then the vector of r′ for m+ 1 candidates is
(t− ~sm+1(m+ 1), t− ~sm+1(m), . . . , t− ~sm+1(1))
= (t− ~sm(m), t− ~sm(m− 1), . . . , t− ~sm(1)) ◦ (t− ~sm+1(1))
Otherwise, ~sm+1 = ~sm ◦ ~sm+1(m+ 1), and the vector of r′ for m+ 1 candidates is
(t− ~sm+1(m+ 1), t− ~sm+1(m), . . . , t− ~sm+1(1))
= (t− ~sm+1(n+ 1)) ◦ (t− ~sm(m), t− ~sm(m− 1), . . . , t− ~sm(1))
Therefore r′ is strongly pure, has polynomial scores (the scores are bounded by t), and is
neither plurality nor veto (because r is neither plurality nor veto). By Theorem 8, Minr′{<k}
is NP-complete and and Minr′{=k} is NP-hard. Since r = (r′)t,1, by Lemma 13 we deduce
that Maxr{>k} is NP-complete and Maxr{=k} is NP-hard. J
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5 Concluding Remarks
We studied the problems determining and minimal and maximal ranks of a candidate in a
partial voting profile. We showed that these problems are fundamentally harder than the
necessary and possible winners that reason about being top ranked: determining whether
the maximal/minimal rank is equal to a given number is DP-complete for every positional
scoring rule, pure or not, including plurality and veto. For the problems of comparison to a
fixed k, we have generally recovered the tractable positional scoring rules of the necessary
winners (for maximum rank) and possible winners (for minimum rank). Many problems
are left for investigation in future research, including: (a) establishing useful tractability
conditions for an input k; (b) completing our results towards full classifications (of the class
of pure rules) for fixed k; and (c) further investigating the parameterized complexity of the
problem when k is the parameter.
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